suspicious of these two religious forces, believing the AKP and Gülen movement to be nurturing a hidden agenda to impair the secular character of the country. The alliance helped to shake the omnipotence and the omnipresence of the military.
Together, Erdoğan and Gülen put an end to the supremacy of the army in both domestic and foreign affairs. But, once the common enemy of the army and Kemalist establishment were drawn aside, personal and ideological discrepancies rose to the surface. Gradually, their alliance and friendship eroded into a more suspicious and competitive relationship. The ultimate break occurred in December 2013. The Gülen movement knew that the AKP was determined to eradicate the hizmet in Turkey, especially when, in October 2013, the government announced its decision to close its prep schools, leaving the cemaat no choice but to strike back. Thanks to sympathizers working in the police and the judiciary, the hizmet revealed via social media several cases of corruption among high-ranking officials, some of whom had close ties to the Erdoğan government, and some who were members of Erdoğan's own family. Vindictive and paranoid, the Turkish prime minister is now waging a war against the hizmet. Numerous members, or alleged members, of the Gülen movement were sacked or removed from the police and judiciary sector, and some were arrested. The repression expands outside national borders, as the hizmet draws much of its strength from its transnational network. Given Erdoğan's stance against the hizmet, what are his chances of eradicating the hizmet? And how will his actions impact on Turkish foreign policy?
While they were allies, the Turkish government and the Gülen movement helped to develop a powerful Turkish presence and influence in their immediate regional environment and beyond. Placing Turkey on the worldwide map was beneficial to both sides; but now the break will likely harm both sides, an outcome for which both share responsibility. The hizmet could not and would not approve the AKP's authoritarian turn, and the hizmet's politicization away from its initial mystic and apolitical identity challenged and threatened the government. The break leaves no winner, but one loser: Turkish soft power, not only in Western Asia but everywhere that it made a difference and made a promising opening for Turkish influence.
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